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Hope for Change in Immigration Policy:
Recommendations for the Obama Administration
by Ajmel Quereshi*

H

istorically,

American

immigration policy has been

1) the need to
replenish the U.S. labor force; 2) a concern to secure
U.S. borders from persons who threaten national security; and
3) a humanitarian calling to open U.S. borders to those seeking
to enter for occupational or familial purposes.
In the 12 years since the passage of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)1 and the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 (“IIRIRA”),2 immigration policy and enforcement in the
United States have become dramatically unbalanced in favor of
security concerns. This shift has been particularly marked since
September 11, 2001. Immigration policy has become focused on
the swift, if often haphazard and inaccurate, removal of persons
whom government officials may believe are unlawfully present.
The shift’s effects on persons, undocumented, documented, and
citizens alike, have been dramatic, raising serious humanitarian
and legal concerns.
President Barack Obama’s election provides an opportunity to rebalance the focus of American immigration policy.
Specifically, his administration has the chance to reverse four
policies whose use has impacted immigrants’ human rights
within the United States dramatically: 1) the increased criminalization of persons detained for routine immigration violations;
2) the dilution of due process rights for persons suspected of
immigration violations; 3) the use of local police to enforce
federal immigration law; and 4) the increased reliance on federal
databases as a means of verifying employee’s employment eligibility. While it cannot be expected that the new administration
will eliminate these programs, one can be hopeful that some of
the suggestions discussed below will be considered as part of a
renewed focus on regaining the balance American immigration
policy has lost.
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guided by three overarching principles:

Five suspects arrested in the ICE raid on the Swift beef plant
Greeley, Colorado.

Release” for all but those suspected of non-immigration related
felonies; 3) eliminate quotas for Immigrations and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) teams’ detentions; and 4) issue regulations
implementing standards for immigration detention facilities.
The implementation of Operation Streamline and increased
use of quotas, in combination with the termination of Catch
and Release, have created an overflow of detainees which the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has been unprepared to handle, thereby creating various problems regarding
adequate conditions and access to counsel.
In 2005, DHS’s Customs and Border Protection Unit (“CBP”)
launched Operation Streamline, under which federal authorities
charge virtually anyone detained for a suspected immigration
violation with a misdemeanor immigration count and then
detain him/her until deportation. In 2008, DHS prosecuted
79,400 persons for immigration related offenses, a fivefold
increase since 2000.
Likewise, in 2006, former DHS secretary Michael Chertoff
announced the end of the Department’s Catch and Release
program, under which suspected immigration offenders were
released under their own recognizance after arrest. In 2005,
DHS detained approximately 34 percent of non-Mexicans for
routine immigration violations. In 2006, over 99 percent were
in custody.
In addition, DHS’s ICE branch has used quotas to drive up
detentions. According to internal reports, in 2006, the agency’s
fugitive operations program—originally intended to capture
violent offenders—required local teams to detain 1,000 persons
per year. Unable to meet quotas, agents have reached outside
the program’s mandate. Approximately 73 percent of the nearly
97,000 people arrested by ICE fugitive operations teams between

I. Reverse the Criminalization of
Immigration Enforcement
Chief among President Obama’s responsibilities will be
to reverse the increased use of the criminal justice system to
process alleged immigration offenders who otherwise would
have passed through civil removal proceedings. To this effect,
his administration should: 1) suspend Operation Streamline
until a thorough review of its effectiveness, legality, and effect
on human rights has been conducted; 2) reinstitute “Catch and
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In 2005, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)5 requests pertaining to more
than 200 immigration detention facilities, finding widespread
problems. The problems faced by thousands of immigrants seeking asylum or other legitimate claims to legal residency, included
lack of access to telephones, attorneys, and legal materials.6 In
July 2007, U.S. District Court Judge Margaret M. Morrow, in a
nationwide permanent injunction, ruled that substantial evidence
showed many facilities limited plaintiffs’ access to counsel by
creating restrictions on telephone use, free calls to legal service
providers, and in some cases, provided phones which could
make only collect telephone calls.7 In addition, the court found
that at multiple facilities, detainees were not given the right to
meet with their counsel in private, were hindered by restrictive
meeting hours, and were denied access to legal materials.8

the program’s inception in 2003 and early 2008 were immigrants
without criminal records. Arrests of immigrants with criminal
convictions have steadily declined, accounting for just 9 percent
of total arrests in 2007, down from 32 percent in 2003.
In some cases, teams have resorted to discriminatory enforcement. According to a January 2009 lawsuit filed by CASA de
Maryland, an immigrant advocacy non-governmental organization (NGO), ICE agents, during a January 2007 raid, surrounded
a Baltimore 7-Eleven convenience store and subsequently
detained all Latino patrons within the vicinity regardless of
documentation or status. Meanwhile, persons of other races were
not detained or questioned.
What makes these tactics even more troubling is that ICE
lacks the facilities to account for the increase in detainees.
Accordingly, ICE has delegated the responsibility for detaining
suspected immigration offenders to privately owned prisons and
local county jails which struggle to provide adequate supervision or medical care. At least 90 persons died while in ICE
custody between 2003 and 2009. According to one internal
study, medical staff members’ action or inaction, contributed to
30 deaths. Only six of the detainees were 70 years or older; 32
were under the age of 40.
By ICE estimates, one in four of the nearly 311,000 detainees annually in ICE custody has a chronic health condition.
Nonetheless, in 2007, Congress allocated merely 61 million
dollars for the Department of Immigration Health Services
(DIHS), and as of 2008, nearly 30 percent of all DIHS positions
were unfilled. The Willacy County, Texas detention center—the
country’s largest, with 2,018 detainees—lacks a clinical director and a pharmacist, and has only one part-time psychiatrist
on staff.
While, as a statutory matter, standards for medical care and
detention of detainees exist, DHS has yet to issue regulations
implementing the requirements. Accordingly, facilities have
been left to interpret the relevant statutes on their own, leading
to inconsistent and substandard results. Numerous groups have
since filed petitions for rulemaking as allowed under section
555 of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA),3 entitling
them, at a minimum, to a response. In April 2008, the National
Immigration Project filed suit alleging that Secretary Chertoff ’s
failure to respond constituted an unlawful delay under section 706(1) of the APA.4 In addition, where DHS has created
system-wide standards, these standards are inadequate. For
example, DHS standards provide that a detainee with a chronic
condition may be treated only if the condition will affect his
deportability.
Beyond the conditions in which they are detained, detainees
are frequently transferred to and between detention centers and
the 350 county jails with which ICE has contracted to house
immigration suspects, thereby affecting their right to obtain and
retain counsel. ICE facilities accommodate merely one in ten
of all persons in custody, and only one in ten detainees is represented by counsel, while detainees increasingly face criminal
charges as a result of Operation Streamline. Accordingly, these
deprivations raise serious concerns over the right to counsel
under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The consequences were apparent after ICE’s 2008 Pottsville, Iowa raid in
which 389 immigrants were detained. Lacking adequate access
to counsel, 297 of the individuals accepted pre-drafted plea bargains within a week of their detention.

II. Restore Due Process Rights
Related to the first set of policies will be the restoration
of due process rights for persons in immigration proceedings.
Specifically, the administration should: 1) restrict expedited
removal to limited areas most dramatically affected by unlawful crossings; 2) annually review which areas are granted such
authority; 3) create an independent body which monitors the
expedited removal process, with a particular focus on asylum
seekers; and 4) restore Matter of Lozada—guaranteeing an
immigrant the constitutional right to effective counsel in a
removal proceeding.
IIRIRA created expedited removal—a process by which
a DHS officer, rather than an Immigration Judge, may find
an individual removable. The Immigration and Naturalization
Service (“INS”), ICE’s predecessor agency, initially applied
expedited removal only to noncitizens arriving at ports of entry.
On August 11, 2004, however, DHS published a notice expanding expedited removal to all immigrants who: lack proper documents; have not been admitted or paroled following inspection
by an immigration officer at a designated port of entry; are
encountered within 100 miles of a U.S. border; and have not
been physically present in the United States for fourteen days.9
Expedited removal is generally not applied to nationals from
Mexico or Canada.
The lack of independent judicial review means that the
only recourse for an asylum applicant wishing to challenge a
determination that they lack a credible fear of persecution if
they return to their country of origin is DHS. If DHS engages
in discriminatory practices, the review procedures provide no
alternative. Even assuming discrimination plays no role, whether
an individual is found to have a credible fear of persecution is
based solely on the facts the asylum officer deems credible and
relevant.
Legal scholars dispute whether persons subject to expedited
removal have constitutional protection. As noted by the Orantes
court, however, agents conducting expedited removal interviews
have often failed to comply with even the minimal due process
procedures that DHS requires. Government officials conducting expedited removal proceedings frequently fail to inform
persons of their right to petition for asylum. At the San Ysidro
entry point, only 9.7 percent of persons detained were informed
of such right.10 This is particularly troubling in light of the fact
that 38 percent of all immigrants placed in expedited removal
proceedings are processed through the port.11 Further, the court
20

The increased delegation [of immigration authority
to local officials away from federal authorities],
combined with Congress’ failure to enact comprehensive
immigration reform, has encouraged cities to
pass ordinances which they lack the expertise to enforce
accurately; spurred discriminatory tactics by
local officials; and deterred immigrant communities
from reporting crime.

found that in ten percent of interviews, officers raised their voice
and/or ridiculed immigrant interviewees.12
According to a United States Commission on International
Religious Freedom study, in at least one location, immigration officers forcefully encouraged asylum seekers to withdraw
applications. Fifteen percent of asylum seekers were not given
a credible fear interview despite expressing fear of returning to
their country of origin. Further, asylum seekers were often inappropriately detained in jails or detention facilities with criminal
inmates. Additionally, it was found that DHS confined one-third
beyond 90 days.13
Due process protections outside of expedited removal have
been weakened by former U.S. Attorney General Michael
Mukasey’s recent administrative decision holding that an immigrant in removal proceedings has no constitutional right to
challenge his or her hearing’s outcome if his or her counsel was
ineffective.14 The ruling disposes of a 20-year-old precedent,
established in Matter of Lozada that allowed immigrants to
obtain a new hearing due to lawyer error under the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment.15 However, a detainee may still
advance an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, but he or she
must prove that the deficiency was egregious and immigration
judges have complete discretion in assessing such claims.16

4) remove civil immigration warrants from the National Crime
Information Center (NCIC) database. The increased delegation, combined with Congress’ failure to enact comprehensive
immigration reform, has encouraged cities to pass ordinances
which they lack the expertise to enforce accurately; spurred
discriminatory tactics by local officials; and deterred immigrant
communities from reporting crime.
Congress has plenary powers “in determining what aliens
shall be admitted to the United States, the period they remain,
regulation of their conduct before naturalization, and the terms
and conditions of their naturalization. Under the Constitution,
the states are granted no such powers. . . .”17 A local regulation of immigration, therefore, is preempted if it: determines
who may remain in the United States; directly conflicts with a
federal statute or regulation; or relates to a field Congress has
preoccupied.18
In 2002, however, the Department of Justice (DOJ) composed a memo encouraging state and localities to enforce federal immigration law under their alleged inherent authority.19
In doing so, it explicitly rejected the constitutional preemption
analysis from a similar 1996 memo.20 This, combined with
the federal government’s failure to pass comprehensive immigration reform, resulted in a steep rise in the number of local
anti-immigrant initiatives around the country. According to the
National Conference of State Legislatures, in 2007, 1,562 pieces
of anti-immigrant legislation were introduced in all 50 states.
Of these, over 240 passed in 41 states. This marked a dramatic
increase from 2005, in which only 300 bills were introduced and
39 were enacted.
Many mirror Hazleton, Pennsylvania’s “Illegal Immigration
Relief Act” which a U.S. District Court struck down in 2007.21
The ordinance, among other things, denies a license to a person
who harbors or employs “unauthorized aliens.”22 In striking down
the housing provision, the court explained the potential pitfalls of
delegating immigration determinations to local officials:

III. Limit Local Enforcement of Federal
Immigration Law
The Obama administration must re-shift the responsibility
for enforcement of immigration law away from local authorities
back towards federal officials. Specifically, the Administration
should: 1) rescind the 2002 Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)
opinion granting local officials the authority to enforce federal
immigration law, and in its place reaffirm the OLC’s 1996 opinion; 2) immediately halt the expansion of the 287(g) program;
3) conduct a thorough review of discriminatory practices by
each locality which has entered into a 287(g) agreement; and
21

detain the person for an additional 48 hours within which ICE
must take custody of him/her.
This is problematic because the files on which the DHS
and Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) rely for immigration information contain errors. Accordingly, the inclusion of
immigration warrants has undermined the validity of the NCIC
database. The NCIC database is now considered so problematic that it has been exempted from the Privacy Act’s accuracy
requirements. While the national error rate of 42 percent is
striking, St. Louis; Kansas City; Washington, D.C.; Greensville,
South Carolina; and Shelby County, Tennessee had error rates
of at least 60 percent when receiving a hit for an immigration
warrant.
Furthermore, the perpetual fear that local officials may
check their immigration status upon any interaction has deterred
immigrant communities from reporting crimes. For example,
in January 2009, José Sánchez laid fatally injured for almost
20 minutes on a sidewalk in a predominantly Latino area of
Washington, D.C., as more than 150 people walked past. Com
munity residents and leaders said they were afraid to call authori
ties for fear of being asked about their immigration status.
Not surprisingly, Hispanics also report significantly lower
levels of confidence in local police. According to the Pew
Hispanic Center, 61% of Hispanics say that they have a great or
fair deal of confidence in police, compared with 78% of whites.
Similarly, 46% of Hispanics report that they believe police will
treat them fairly compared with 74% of whites.
In 2004, the National Council of LaRaza, the nation’s largest Hispanic advocacy organization, filed suit alleging that the
inclusion of civil immigration warrants: 1) required local officials to make civil immigration arrests which, under DeCanas v.
Bica,28 they did not have the authority to make; and 2) violated
Congressional guidelines which limit the type of information
included in the database.29 While the Court initially denied
defendant’s motion for summary judgment, in 2007, it dismissed
the complaint for lack of standing.30
Similarly, in 2008, the ACLU of Northern California filed
suit against Sonoma County and ICE alleging among other
things that the issuance of immigration detainers to localities
for immigrants who had not committed drug offenses exceeded
ICE’s authority under the relevant federal regulations.31

Changing status from authorized to unauthorized is
complex . . . . Some individuals can affirmatively apply
for regularization of status. In other instances, regularization of status is only available after an individual
has been placed in removal proceedings . . . It may take
months or years for an applicant to adjust status, obtain
relief or otherwise regularize status. Submitting an
application does not change an individual’s immigration status, even if the application is bona fide and will
ultimately be approved. A person who is proceeding
through the procedure to adjust his immigration status
but who currently lacks immigration status frequently
will not have any documents to indicate whether he has
a valid claim to remain in the country.23
Some localities have gone further, entering Memorandums of
Understanding with the federal government, commonly termed
287(g) agreements, by which local officers are deputized to act
as federal immigration agents. Originally created in 1996, localities expressed little interest prior to September 11, 2001. With
former U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft’s encouragement,
however, 67 localities in 20 states have entered into such agreements and 80 other localities have applications pending.24
Rather than pursuing violent offenders as proponents have
proclaimed is the program’s objective, deputized agents have
frequently used discriminatory traffic stops to detain suspected
immigration offenders. For example, in May 2008, 83 percent
of immigrants arrested in Gaston County, North Carolina by
authorized agents were charged with traffic violations. In July,
2008, the ACLU of Arizona filed suit against Sherriff Joe Arpaio
of Maricopa County, who on multiple occasions, coordinated
“crime suppression operations” in which all persons detained
were of Latino origin.25
The suspicion of discriminatory intent has been buttressed
by deputized officers’ statements. Arpaio praised as “patriotic”
private groups, including the American Freedom Riders, that
have harassed all Latino persons entering and leaving legal centers in the county.26 The Southern Poverty Law Center, a human
rights group in Alabama, has categorized the American Freedom
Riders as a nativist extremist organization, “meaning that it
targets individual immigrants rather than immigration policies.” Likewise, Alamance County, North Carolina Sheriff Terry
Johnson characterized Mexicans as follows: “Their values are a
lot different—their morals—than what we have here. In Mexico,
there’s nothing wrong with having sex with a 12, 13-year-old
girl . . . They do a lot of drinking down in Mexico.”27
Even those localities which have not taken affirmative action
against suspected illegal immigrants have been affected by
the federal government’s decision to include civil immigration
warrants in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC)
database. The NCIC database historically has included persons
wanted for felony crimes such as murder and rape or serious
misdemeanors. In 2002, DHS began entering into NCIC records
persons with outstanding orders of deportation, exclusion, or
removal. State and local police regularly access the database
during the course of regular patrol duties. When a local police
officer stops a driver for a traffic violation, for example, he or
she may run the driver’s biographical information through the
database to check for outstanding arrest warrants. If a warrant
is found, ICE, then, issues a detainer allowing for the locality to

VI. Limit Reliance on Federal Databases
Until Their Accuracy is Verified
Finally, more generally, the Administration must limit its
reliance on federal databases storing immigration information
until their accuracy can be verified. Specifically, it should: 1)
rescind Executive Order 13465 and related regulations requiring most federal contractors to use the Basic Pilot Program
or “E-Verify”; and 2) rescind recent “no-match” regulations
creating a presumption of illegality for workers whose information does not match that in the Social Security Administration’s
(SSA) database. The federal government’s increased reliance on
the SSA database has perpetuated the wrongful firing of numerous individuals, increased discrimination, and burdened small
businesses.
Basic Pilot, or E-Verify, is one of three voluntary electronic employment eligibility verification pilot programs
Congress created under IIRIRA. Congress at the time instructed:
22

Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).39 The rule’s safe harbor provision
allows an employer to avoid liability by checking his or her own
records within 30 days and then asking its employee to submit
verification of the information he or she originally submitted
within 90 days.40
In 2007, the American Federation of Labor successfully persuaded a U.S. District Court in California to preliminarily enjoin
the rule. The court explained that the rule was issued without
any explanation as to the data the agency had considered, or its
basis for concluding, in light of the SSA database’s error rate,
why a letter was a reasonable indicator of illegality.41
Furthermore, DHS independently of DOJ, in contravention of IRCA, determined that if employers complied with the
statute they would not be subject to discrimination claims.42
Such concerns are not to be taken lightly. A 1990 Government
Accountability Office report estimated that 461,000 employers
began discriminating on the basis of national origin after the
U.S. Congress created the first employer sanctions for hiring
undocumented workers in 1986.43
Finally, DHS failed to conduct a final flexibility analysis
even though the rule would have a significant impact on small
businesses.44 A U.S. Chamber of Commerce commissioned
analysis concluded that the total societal cost of the regulation
would be 10 billion dollars per year, most of which would be
felt by small business which have hired between 60 and 80 percent of all new hires in the last ten years. In October 2008, the
Bush Administration re-issued the rule, with additional analysis,
unchanged.45

“[e]xcept as specifically provided in subsection (e) [referring to
the required use of E-Verify by federal agencies, the Legislative
Branch and certain immigration law violators], the Secretary of
Homeland Security may not require any person or other entity to
participate in a pilot program.”32
Regardless, in June 2008, former U.S. President George W.
Bush issued Executive Order 13465, which mandates that public
and private contractors and subcontractors that sign contracts
with the federal government worth more than $100,000 and
$3,000, respectively, use E-Verify to verify their employees’ eligibility.33 A proposed rule implementing the order clarified that
not only would employers be required to check the employment
eligibility of all newly-hired employees, but also that of existing
employees “assigned to the contract.”34
On December 23, 2008, the Chamber of Commerce and a
group of contractors’ associations filed suit alleging that the
mandate expressly violated IIRIRA’s limitations.35 On March
18, 2009, the Obama administration delayed implementation of
the rule until May 21, 2009, subject to its review of the mandate.
Beyond the program’s legality, E-Verify’s error rates are
well documented. According to the SSA, approximately 17.8
million of its files include erroneous information; 12.7 million
concerning U.S. citizens. The SSA’s Office of Inspector General
reports that the SSA database has a 4.1 percent error rate. A
DHS-commissioned report, released in 2007, found that 0.1%
of native-born citizens and 10% of naturalized citizens would
be tentatively non-confirmed because of erroneous data in DHS
files. Accordingly, the report concluded that E-Verify “is still not
sufficiently up to date” to meet the requirements for “accurate
verification.”36
These problems are exacerbated by employers’ hesitation
about hiring undocumented persons and the administrative cost
associated with such challenges. Under the voluntary program,
9.4 percent of employers failed to inform workers of a non-confirmation notice in 2007. Seven percent of those who did give
notice, did not encourage employees to challenge the determination because of the process’s length.
Despite these problems, the Bush Administration expanded
the use of the SSA database through other programs. Since
1994, SSA has sent “no-match” letters to employers as a means
of correcting information regarding employees who submit inaccurate information.37 In previous years, the receipt of a no-match
letter “[did] not imply that you or your employee intentionally
gave the government wrong information about the employee’s
name or Social Security number. Nor [did] it make any statement about an employee’s immigration status.”38
In 2007, the Bush Administration issued a final rule entitled “Safe-Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a
No-Match Letter” cautioning that receipt of a no-match letter
“may lead to a finding that an employer had . . . constructive
knowledge” of an employee’s unauthorized status, thus subjecting him or her to sanction under Immigration Reform and

Conclusion
The myriad of policy changes required to rebalance American
immigration policy are extensive. Likewise, the problems associated with each of the programs discussed, and the methods
which might be used to correct such problems, are diverse.
Furthermore, combined with each of these, the Administration
must also take proactive steps, including the adjustment of
standards for a finding of family hardship, the creation of a
viable path to citizenship, and most importantly, reversing trade
policies which depress economic conditions in other countries,
thereby motivating emigration.
The goal is to highlight those preliminary steps immigration reformers generally agree are necessary to change the most
problematic programs. It is not yet clear what steps the new
administration will take. President Obama’s decision to suspend
the E-Verify requirement pending further review, and Secretary
Janet Napolitano’s comprehensive review of DHS’s programs,
provide hope for a new direction. That said, DHS’s furtherance
of a lawful status requirement for driver’s licenses, and Secretary
Napolitano’s support for Secure Communities, a national biometrics database, have tempered enthusiasm. Ultimately, all
advocates can be sure that they will have more of a voice in this
Administration than the last, making policy recommendations
all the more necessary.		
HRB
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